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LIABILITY FOR THE RELEASE OF GMOS INTO
THE ENVIRONMENT: EXPLORING THE
BOUNDARIES OF NUISANCE
CHRISTOPHER P. RODGERS*
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF GMO RELEASES
THE widespread commercial planting of genetically modi®ed crops
has yet to be sanctioned in Europe, but cannot be far away. This
is a prospect that arouses considerable public concern as to both
the health and environmental implications of genetically modi®ed
organisms (``GMOs''). The application of biotechnology in the
development of new agricultural products raises major concerns
not only for environmental protection, however, but also for the
potential role of liability regimes in the allocation and protection
of property rights. In the European Union, a regulatory
framework for ®eld trials and the commercial exploitation of GM
crops was introduced at a relatively early stage in the development
of agricultural biotechnology. The Directives on the Deliberate
Release into the Environment of Genetically Modi®ed Organisms
and on the Contained Use of genetically modi®ed microorganisms1
require technocratic authorisation processes based on a scienti®c
risk assessment of GM releases. They require member states to
establish arrangements for ®eld trials under licence (so-called ``Part
B'' authorisations applicable to experimental releases), and to
prohibit the subsequent marketing of a genetically modi®ed crop
or seed without a Part C authorisation permitting commercial
releases. The relevant authorisations are to be granted only after
the conduct of a scienti®c risk assessment upon which the public
authorities can satisfy themselves that the release is safe. Under
the revised Deliberate Releases Directive adopted in 2001,2 the risk
* Professor of Law, University of Wales, Aberystwyth. This paper develops a number of themes
presented in a general report delivered at the 16th Congress of the International Academy of
Comparative Law, University of Queensland, Australia, in July 2002. The author is grateful to
Lynda Warren, Jane Glenn, Peggy Grossman and Michael Cardwell for their comments on
earlier drafts.
1 O.J. 1990 L. 117 p. 1 and 15, 23 April 1990. The 1990 Deliberate Releases Directive has been
repealed and replaced by Directive 2001/18/E.C., O.J. L. 106 17.4.2001.
2 Directive 2001/18/E.C. O.J. L. 106 17.4.2001. The Directive came into force on 17 October 2002.
For an appraisal of the environmental risk assessment regime under the revised Directive see T.
Sampson, ``Environmental Risk Assessment of GHOs under Directive 2001/18: An Eective
Safety Net or a Collective Illusion?'' (2003) 25(2) E.I.P.R. 79.
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assessment will in future require the ``direct, indirect, immediate
and delayed'' eects to be taken into account when assessing the
potentially adverse eects of a GMO. Market authorisations under
the new Directive are to be given for a limited period of 10 years.
The amendments to the EC legislation were intended to speed up,
and introduce greater transparency into, the administrative
decision making processes required for the release and marketing
of GMOs.
Under procedures laid down in the United Kingdom to
implement these requirements, the marketing of new GM seeds can
only be undertaken if the seeds are ocially listed,3 and after trial
plantings that inevitably involve a release to the environment in
controlled conditions.4 The release of a GMO into the environment
in this way can only be undertaken with the consent of the
Secretary of State, who must be satis®ed that it is safe.5 Expert
scienti®c advice on the safety of releases is provided by the
Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment (``ACRE'').
The government launched an extensive programme of Farm Scale
Evaluations in 1999, although to date only one Part C licence for
the commercial exploitation of a GM crop has been granted, for
Chardon LL, an herbicide resistant GM maize fodder crop
developed by Aventis.6
Despite the application of complex trialling and authorisation
procedures, the introduction of GM crops and their potential
impact on wildlife and the environment continue to generate
considerable public concern. An opinion poll conducted in 1999
found that 79% of the British public opposed even the conduct of
®eld trials of GM crops7 and public resistance to trial plantings has
manifested itself in a number of high pro®le acts of mass trespass
and damage to GM trial crops.8 The government's own advisers on
biotechnology and nature conservation have also expressed concern
3 See the Seeds (National Lists of Varieties) Regulations 1982, especially reg. 11(3).
4 Although some would argue that this is not a release into the environment but a test of what
such a release might lead to.
5 Environmental Protection Act 1990, ss. 108±112.
6 Chardonn L.L. was granted a part C commercial licence in 1998, under the more limited
assessment procedures contained in the 1990 Deliberate Releases Directive. It is being re-
assessed in the Farm Scale Evaluations initiated by the government in 1999, under the terms of
the agreement with the biotechnology industry underpinning the ``moratorium'' on GM
plantings in the UK.
7 Greenpeace Press Release, 10 April 1999. The survey was conducted by MORI, an independent
public polling organisation.
8 The ``decontamination'' of a GM farm scale trial in East Anglia by Lord Peter Melchett and
27 Greenpeace volunteers in 2000 was perhaps the most well known. The refusal of a jury at
Norwich Crown Court to convict them of either theft or criminal damage, and their
subsequent acquittal on all charges, underlines the unease felt by members of the public about
the trial planting programme and the safety of GM technology. See Greenpeace Press Release,
``Greenpeace welcomes verdict and calls on Government to end GM Farm Experiments'', 20
September 2000.
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about the implications for the protection of biodiversity of the
introduction of herbicide resistant GM oilseed rape and beet crops.9
The crisis of con®dence in the trialling and authorisation
procedures for the release of GMOs re¯ects a general decline of
public con®dence in ``sound science'', and skepticism about ocial
reassurances as to risk assessment.10 This springs, in large part,
from public concern about the way in which the BSE crisis was
dealt with by governmental agencies in the UK, and a loss of
con®dence in the value of governmental processes for establishing
and safeguarding environmental risk.11 Public concern might be
assuaged by the introduction of more participatory and transparent
models for decision making about GM ®eld trials and licensing.
The Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission
(``AEBC'')12 recently published a case study of decision making in
the Farm Scale Evaluations of GM crops undertaken so far in the
UK,13 and is currently considering mechanisms for promoting an
eective debate on their commercialisation following the completion
of the current round of Farm Scale Evaluations.14 Whether these
initiatives will assuage public opinion as to the ``soundness'' of
scienti®c advice about the environmental implications of GM
technology remains to be seen.
Given the apparent failure of con®dence in state governance,
attention has turned towards the development of an approach
based on property rights and civil liability to oer solutions for
9 Agriculture and Environmental Biotechnology Commission (``AEBC'') Looking Ahead: an
AEBC Horizon Scan (AEBC 2002) at para. 69.: English Nature Research Report No. 443
Gene-stacking in herbicide tolerant oilseed rape: lessons from the North American experience
(English Nature, February 2002).
10 See generally M. Cardwell, ``The Release of Genetically Modi®ed Organisms into the
Environment: Public Concerns and Regulatory Responses'', (2002) 4 Env. L. Rev. 156. For a
discussion of some of the key issues surrounding the regulation of GM releases in the US see
Neil D. Hamilton, ``Legal Issues Shaping Society's Acceptance of Biotechnology and
Genetically Modi®ed Organisms'' (2001) 6 Drake Journal of Agricultural Law 81 (although,
as Cardwell points out, any comparisons with the US position must take into account the fact
that concerns about the environmental implications of GMO releases developed much later in
the US and have been more muted: (2002) 4 Env. L. Rev. 156 at 166).
11 See generally G. Little, ``BSE and the Regulation of Risk'' (2001) 64 M.L.R. 730; also the
®ndings of the Phillips Report on the BSE crisis: Vol. 1 Findings and Conclusions: Executive
Summary of the Report of the Enquiry, 1 Key Conclusions (available at http://
www.bseinquiry.gov.uk.html).
12 The Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission was established in 2000 to
promote public debate on the issues surrounding GM crops and to advise the government on
a wide range of issues concerning GMOs and the environment, including revisions to the
regulatory framework for GMO authorisations and liability for damage arising from the
introduction of GM crops.
13 Crops on Trial (AEBC 2001), available at www.aebc.gov.uk
14 To this end the AEBC has established a public attitudes development group to take this
forward and provide further advise on how and when a public debate about the possible
commercialisation of GM crops might be initiated. See the AEBC Draft Revised Work Plan
(AEBC April 2002).
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damage caused by GMO releases.15 Potential liability for economic
or environmental losses ¯owing from the introduction of GM
crops, and the question of who should pay for any resulting
damage (the Agri biotechnology companies or farmers growing GM
crops, for example), has become a key focal point in the dispute
over the commercialisation of GM crops.16
Although the debate is in its early stages in the UK, there have
already been a number of liability suits in the USA and Canada,
though none have, as yet, been decided. In some, farmers have
sued the biotechnology companies alleging economic loss ¯owing
from contamination of their non-GM crops with GM material
emanating from products promoted by the corporations.17 A
number of nuisance suits in the USA are ongoing following the
recent discovery that particles of the GM corn ``Star Link'' had
entered the human food chain.18 This crop expresses an insecticide
protein Cry9C that is not approved by the US Environment
Protection Agency for human consumption, and the discovery of
GM ``contamination'' emanating from Star Link damaged domestic
and export markets for US corn. On a pre-trial motion to dismiss
the consolidated actions in the Star Link litigation, the farmers'
allegation that pollen from GM corn had drifted across property
lines onto their land was held to support their private nuisance
claims under state law. A similar decision was given upholding their
right to bring public nuisance claims arising from the alleged
contamination of the general corn supply and its detrimental
economic eect on corn producers.19 In Canada, organic growers in
Saskatchewan have claimed that the introduction of Monsanto's
Roundup Ready Canola20 and Aventis' Liberty Link Canola has
15 See generally D. Campbell, ``Of Coase and Corn: A (Sort of ) Defence of Private Nuisance''
(2000) 63 M.L.R. 197.
16 The potential liability problems arising from the introduction of dierent types of herbicide
and insecticide resistant GM crops is the subject of the latest consultation exercise initiated by
the AEBC: AEBC Consultation About GM Crops: Post-Commercialisation Scenarios
(September 2002). This posits nine scenarios for discussion involving potential loss ¯owing
from the introduction of GM crops, including the ``contamination'' of neighbouring crops,
biodiversity damage and economic damage to organic producers facing the loss of their
certi®ed organic status.
17 See Philip Jones, ``Litigation in the Wind'' (April 2002), available at http://www.biotech-
info.net/wind.html
18 See In Re Star Link Corn Products Liability Litigation, Marvin Kramer et al. v. Aventis Crop
Science USA Holding Inc. et al. (2002) 212 F.Supp.2d 828 (US District Court N.D. Illinois).
19 (2002) 212 F.Supp.2d 828, at 845. (Senior District Judge Moran). The litigation is complex,
involving product liability claims, in addition to claims in negligence and nuisance, and the
potential for the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) to exclude
claims in state law based on labelling and packaging requirements. The district court held, on
a preliminary motion, that the claims in nuisance and negligence were pre empted by FIFRA
insofar as they sought to impose a labelling requirement on the defendants which went
beyond the federal labelling requirements set out in FIFRA. The other pre-trial motions
challenging the claims based in nuisance and negligence, including those alleging
contamination of neighbouring crops, were dismissed.
20 I.e. rapeseed.
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destroyed the market for their organic crops, alleging that because
GM canola has been found growing on land for which it was not
intended (so called ``volunteer'' GM plants) it is now impossible to
obtain organic accreditation for organic canola production. The
Saskatchewan Organic Directorate is currently campaigning to
prevent the introduction of the next Monsanto product, Roundup
Ready Wheat, which it claims will have the same eect on the
production of organic winter wheat in the province.21 In other suits,
farmers have initiated legal action against neighbouring farmers,
claiming crop contamination due to pollen from GM crops coming
onto their property via wind drift or insect pollination. There are
also analogies with pesticide drift cases, where organic farmers have
in the past successfully sued crop dusters for the contamination of
organic land with chemical pesticides sprayed from the air over
neighbouring farms.22
The only decisions so far in which the liability and property
rights issues have been explored have been outside the law of tort.
The most well known is the recent Canadian decision in Monsanto
v. Schmeiser.23 This was a patent infringement claim brought by
Monsanto against an arable farmer whose rapeseed crop had
acquired its patented RT73 gene, either by wind drift and cross-
pollination or by any of a number of other unproved means.
Monsanto's patent infringement claim was successful at ®rst
instance, in a surprising decision that illustrates a number of the
problems that would be inherent in a nuisance suit for GM
contamination.24 The decision has now been upheld in the
Canadian Federal Court of Appeal, and may go to the Canadian
Supreme Court.25 Schmeiser did not counterclaim for damages in
nuisance, although the reasons for his failure to do so are far from
clear.26 In R. v. Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte
Watson27 an approval granted to the National Institute for
Agricultural Botany for ®eld trials of GM maize at a site in Devon
was challenged on judicial review by a neighbouring organic
producer. This challenge, mounted in administrative law, was
21 See the website of the Saskatchewan Organic Directorate for press releases and further
information : http://www.saskorganic.com.
22 See for example Langan v. Valicopters Inc. (1977) 88 Mn.2d 855 (Washington State Supreme
Court).
23 (2001) 12 C.P.R. (4th) 204 (F.C.T.D.). For criticism see generally Maria Lee and Robert
Burrell, ``Liability for the Escape of GM Seeds: Pursuing the Victim?'' (2002) 65 M.L.R. 517,
H. Wilkins and F. Latorre, ``Biodiversity at a Crossroads'' (2002) 4 Env. L. Rev. 62.
24 These are explored further below: see note 59.
25 (2002) F.C.A. 309 (reserved judgment delivered on 4 September 2002). Leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada has been applied for.
26 The principal reason may be procedural. Nuisance suits fall under provincial court
jurisdiction, whereas Monsanto ®led their patent suit in the Canadian Federal Patent Court
(which has no jurisdiction in nuisance cases).
27 [1999] Env. L. R. 310 (CA).
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ultimately unsuccessful due to the court's unwillingness to interfere
with the risk assessment undertaken by the ACRE. In the course of
a short judgment dismissing the claim, Buxton L.J. commented that
the applicant's case ``sounded like one of private nuisance'' and
should have been pleaded as such, as the claim was ultimately
aimed at restricting the NIAB's right to use property for an
otherwise legitimate purpose. Although these issues were not
explored in depth, this case (like Schmeiser) illustrates a number of
diculties in the way of a plainti seeking to establish liability for
alleged GM ``contamination'' in nuisance, to which we will return
below.
Supplanting these cases in importance, however, is the pending
litigation in Homan, LB Homan Farms Inc. and Beaudoin v.
Monsanto Canada and Aventis Crop Science Canada Holding Inc.,28
a case that arises from the Saskatchewan Organic Directorate's
campaign to prevent the introduction of Roundup Ready Wheat on
the Canadian prairies. With the Directorate's support, two certi®ed
organic producers have initiated a class action against Monsanto
and Aventis on behalf of all organic farmers in Saskatchewan
certi®ed as such between 1 January 1996 and 31 December 2001.
The plainti 's statement of claim alleges that as a result of the
widespread contamination of their crops by GM canola (rapeseed),
very few organic grain farmers are able to grow canola, and that
this cropÐan important tool in the crop rotations of organic
farmersÐhad been lost to organic farmers in Saskatchewan.29 They
also claim that if GM wheat is introduced by Monsanto on a
commercial scale, this crop will also be lost to organic producers
owing to cross contamination and the withdrawal of certi®ed
organic status from aected producers. The claim (unlike that in ex
parte Watson) has been drawn in tort, alleging nuisance (the
introduction of GM canola into the Saskatchewan environment,
thereby interfering with certi®ed growers' use and enjoyment of
their land), negligence (breaching a duty of care owed to certi®ed
producers by failing to ensure that GM seed would not in®ltrate
farmland, and failing to warn producers of the dangers of cross
contamination), strict liability under the Rylands v. Fletcher30
principle (engaging in a non natural user of land and allowing the
escape of substances likely to cause damage to neighbouring
property owners) and trespass.31 There has been some preliminary
28 2002 Sask.Q.B. no 67
29 The Statement of Claim can be viewed on the Saskatchewan Organic Directorate's website:
http://www.saskorganic.com.
30 (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
31 The pleadings also allege breach of duties under two environmental protection statutes: the
Saskatchewan Environmental Management and Protection Act (release of a ``pollutant'') and
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skirmishing between the parties, but the litigation has not yet
reached a full hearing.
The decision in Homan Farms will be eagerly awaited, and may
have major implications for plans to license GM crops for
commercial exploitation in the UK. Whatever the outcome, the
Canadian litigation will throw into sharp relief the issues
surrounding environmental liability for GMO ``contamination'', and
the potential use of tort law to modulate property rights and risk
where the introduction of GM crops is involved. These issues will
undoubtedly have to be faced by the English courts if the
commercial planting of GM crops is authorised following the
completion and appraisal of the Farm Scale Evaluation programme.
GMO RELEASES: WHAT ROLE FOR PRIVATE NUISANCE?
The introduction of GM crops could constitute a public nuisance
aecting a section of the general public, especially where there is
widespread cross-pollination of wild plants or of non-GM crops
grown by other farmers in the immediate neighbourhood. It has
limited utility, however, as a basis for adjudicating on liability
claims arising from the introduction of GMOs. Public nuisance
does not commonly provide monetary damages to private plaintis,
and actions for injunctions are sought either by the Attorney
General or the local authorities, unless an individual claimant can
prove ``special'' damage beyond that suered by the general public.
The law of private nuisance is therefore more likely to provide the
basis for a civil liability regime directed at mediating alleged
damage and property rights disputes arising from the introduction
of GM crops.32 Similarly, in the present context it is unlikely that
liability could in practice arise under the principle in Rylands v.
Fletcher but not in private nuisance. It is improbable that the
courts would interpret the growing of GM crops as a non natural
user of land, and in any case the ``escape'' of GM pollen leading to
cross fertilisation of neighbouring non-GM crops would rarely if
ever be an isolated event within the scope of the Rylands principle.
The following discussion focuses primarily, therefore, on the
the Environmental Assessment Act (S.S. 1979±80) (for unauthorised development within the
meaning of section 2 of that Act, involving the unauthorised uncon®ned release of GM canola
or the con®ned ®eld trials of GM wheat undertaken since 1998 by Monsanto).
32 It is worth noting, however, that the claimants in the Star Link Corn Products Liability
Litigation (above note 18) have, in addition to damages claims grounded in private nuisance,
pleaded that the contamination of the general food corn supply in that case amounted to
public nuisance. Public Nuisance also features in some of the claims in the ongoing litigation
in Canada in Homan, LB Homan Farms Inc. and Beaudoin v. Monsanto Canada and Aventis
Crop Science Canada Holding Inc. (above note 28).
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potential for private nuisance to provide a basis from which a
liability regime might be developed.
The established rules of private nuisance give rise to a number
of diculties when GM technology is considered. The right to sue
in nuisance, for example to challenge the introduction of GM crops
on a neighbouring property, is currently exercisable only by those
with an aected property interest.33 This would oer possible
redress to adjoining landowners who may be organic producers
fearing GM contamination of their crops, but not to the wider
public. Another issue concerns the nature of the interests protected
in nuisance. The claimant's land use must not be ``hypersensitive'',
and there is as yet no clear guidance whether the use of land for
organic production would be viewed by the courts as overly
sensitive, and thus unprotected in nuisance.34 There are also
problems inherent in the use of the ``locality'' test to establish the
reasonableness of new land uses on existing patterns of production
and land use.
A number of dierent claims may ¯ow from the release of
GMOs to the environment. These must be clearly identi®ed before
an appraisal of the potential role of the law of nuisance in this area
can be attempted. Where GM crops are introduced, the potential
cross-fertilisation of non-GM crops on neighbouring farms will be a
key issue. Where this occurs, the question will be whether cross-
fertilisation amounts to ``damage'' of the claimant's non-GM crops
in the required sense, and is therefore potentially remediable in
nuisance. Another corollary of the introduction of some types of
GM crop might be ``biodiversity damage'' i.e. damage to the
environmental quality of a claimant's land, which is no longer able
to sustain populations of wild ¯ora and fauna due to the
degradation of the ecosystems prevalent there. This might be the
case, for example, where pesticide or herbicide resistant GM crops
are introduced on neighbouring holdings. In this instance the
``damage'' may result, however, not from the introduction of the
GM crop per se, but from the increased use of herbicides or
pesticides to which that crop has been rendered immune by genetic
manipulation, leading to a degradation of sensitive ecosystems in
the locality. Inasmuch as this type of case does not involve a direct
interference with established categories of property right it is
problematic, and unlikely to be remediable in private nuisance.
There would, in any event, be dicult causative issues if a civil
liability regime provided for this type of claim. Finally, where the
introduction of GM technology is challenged, neighbouring
33 See Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd. [1997] A.C. 655.
34 See R. v. Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Watson [1999] Env. L. Rev. 310.
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proprietors may allege damage to their commercial interestÐfor
example the withdrawal of ``organic'' farming status, with a
consequent impairment of their ability to market their produce as
``GM-free''. This third type of claim may be remediable in
nuisance, although the case law is (as we shall see) confused and
relatively undeveloped.
Whether the law of nuisance can oer a remedy for alleged GM
``contamination'' will depend upon the type of damage for which
redress is ought. It is a well-established principle, for example, that
no suit lies in nuisance if the act complained of merely aects the
pro®tability of the plainti 's commercial activities, without aecting
the carrying out of the business on his land.35 It is not enough to
make it actionable that the complainant (for example, an organic
farmer) faces commercial damage if his neighbour introduces GM
crops. He must establish a property right that has been infringed.36
This will be problematic, and raises questions as to the extent to
which a claimant's land-use rights will be protected. It could be
argued that the land-use rights of adjoining owners will not usually
be aected by the introduction of GM crops on neighbouring
landÐrather the type of land use they practice (organic production)
may be threatened. On the other hand, the case law discloses
examples of nuisance providing a remedy to protect particular types
of user, provided they are not hypersensitive.37 The question in the
type of case presently under consideration will be whether the right
to produce organically is a legally protected interest of the claimant
and whether, by planting GM crops, the defendant has
unreasonably interfered with it. In the case of potential impacts on
biodiversityÐfor example if gene technology is used to increase the
tolerance of crops to pesticides or herbicidesÐthe question also
arises whether the right aected is a private property right
protected by the law of nuisance. If it is one of a public interest
nature it will only be protected in private (as opposed to public)
nuisance if there is also some private right interfered with.
Interference with another's use and enjoyment of land is not per
se actionable. The law of nuisance requires that the interference be
substantial, in the sense that the claimant cannot reasonably be
35 See Victoria Park Racing v. Taylor (1937) 58 C.L.R. 457.
36 The traditional basis of private nuisance was re-stated in these terms by the House of Lords
in Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd. [1997] A.C. 655. But cf. the more imaginative approach to
commercial losses taken in some of the ``natural nuisance'' cases discussed below, for example
French v. Auckland City Council [1974] 1 N.Z.L.R. 340.
37 See for example Christie v. Davey [1893] 1 Ch. 316 (injunctive relief granted to prevent
interference with music lessons conducted by the claimant in a neighbouring house) and
Hollywood Silver Fox Farm Ltd. v. Emmett [1936] 2 K.B. 468. Note, however, that the
interference in these cases was rendered actionable by reason of its malicious nature. The
farmer planting GM crops is more likely to be motivated by factors involving pro®tability
and production costs than a malicious intent to interfere with his neighbour's crops.
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expected to put up with it.38 The focus here is on the interference
with the claimant's land-use rights, and not the reasonableness of
the defendant's actions. Although the exercise is essentially one of
balancing the competing property interests of neighbouring
landowners, therefore, the law of nuisance is claimant sided.39 It is
not an exercise in balancing the social or economic utility of the
defendant's conduct against the damage it causes to the claimant.
This is important in the context of GM technology, as the alleged
bene®ts ¯owing from the introduction of GM crops (greater yield
for example) cannot in principle be brought into account against an
alleged interference with the private property rights of neighbouring
landowners. Similarly, whether interference is suciently
``substantial'' to ground an action in nuisance should be considered
by looking at the claimant's land use and assessing the magnitude
of the impacts arising from the alleged nuisance. The nature of the
alleged nuisance itself (in this case growing GM crops on adjoining
property) should not in itself be a relevant factor.
When these basic tenets of the law of nuisance are examined in
the context of potential claims for GM crop ``contamination'', the
tensions between environmental policy and the de®nition and extent
of property rights protected in the law of tort immediately becomes
apparent. In Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd.40 Lord Go quoted with
approval the following de®nition of nuisance: ``In true cases of
nuisance the interest of the plainti which is invaded is . . . the
interest of liberty to exercise rights over land in the amplest
manner''.41 Were the courts to refuse a remedy for the unconsented
genetic alteration of a claimant's produce by cross-pollination from
nearby GM crops, this would render his property right contingent.
He may choose to farm organically, but his right to do what he
likes on his own land would in eect become subject to the state's
right to determine that that right be protected only if its exercise
pursues an economic function approved by the state.42 In not
protecting it, the state would be elevating the property right of the
GM producer over those of neighbouring non-GM producers, a
position which involves a tacit endorsement of the economic
priority to be given to GM production. In this regard the
regulatory regime for authorising GM releases also has a
potentially key role to play in allocating and legitimating property
rights.
38 Kennaway v. Thompson [1981] Q.B. 88.
39 See A. Grubb, The Law of Torts (2001) Butterworths, Common Law Library, at para. 22.39.
40 [1997] A.C. 667, at 688.
41 F.H. Newark, ``The Boundaries of Nuisance'' (1949) 65 L.Q.R. 480, 488±489.
42 See D. Campbell, ``Of Coase and Corn'', above note 15, pp. 214±215 on this aspect of the
problem.
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CLASSIFYING NUISANCE CLAIMS FOR GM ``CONTAMINATION''
The common law has traditionally distinguished between cases
involving physical damage, and those involving interference with
the claimant's comfort and convenience, when assessing whether
interference with property rights is suciently ``substantial'' to
engage liability in nuisance.43 Where the nuisance is caused by
encroachment or physical damage, the character and situation of
the neighbourhood and the surrounding circumstances are not in
principle to be taken into account. The only limitation is that the
claimant cannot recover for interference with an abnormally
sensitive use of his property.44 Where, on the other hand, the
substantial interference alleged is merely with the comfort or
convenience of the claimant, then the gravity of the infringement of
property rights is assessed objectively. The court will look at the
nature and extent of the interference with the character of the
neighbourhood and the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct.
Whether the law of nuisance can provide a mechanism to
resolve property rights disputes arising from the introduction of
GM crops depends, in part, into which of these two categories they
are placed by the courts. The approach taken to the ®rst order
decision on categorising the claim will be important, and will be
determinative of the ultimate utility of tort based remedies in cases
involving GM releases. If the courts view this type of case merely
as an interference with the comfort/convenience of the non-GM
claimant then the character of the neighbourhood becomes an issue.
The ``locality'' test focuses on the predominant land use in the
geographical area concerned and its social and environmental
qualities, and gives normative eect to collective land-use decisions
made within the community. If an area has declared itself ``GM
free'' and has a preponderance of organic producers, therefore, this
would in principle be relevant, and the introduction of GM
technology on one farm more likely to constitute an actionable
nuisance. It would be immaterial whether the decision to become
GM free was made collectively by a local body (for example a local
authority or producers co-operative) or had come about by
individual producers adopting this stance independently of one
another. In some cases, on the other hand, the nuisance may be
claimed to involve physical damageÐas might be claimed, for
example, where the genetic makeup of organic produce has been
altered by cross pollination with neighbouring GM crops. In this
type of case the character of the neighbourhood should in principle
43 St. Helens Smelting Co. Ltd. v. Tipping (1865) 11 H.L.C. 642.
44 See McKinnon Industries Ltd. v. Walker (1951) 3 D.L.R. 577, discussed further below.
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only be relevant if the court categorises the alleged nuisance as an
interference with the convenience or enjoyment of the claimant's
property, and not as a physical damage suit. If this type of case
would more properly be categorised as a physical damage claim,
then the locality test will become irrelevantÐalthough the issue of
hypersensitivity in the claimant's land use (for example organic
production) remains.
DEFINING ``DAMAGE'' TO PROPERTY
The classi®cation of nuisance claims therefore depends on the
court's view of the nature of the damage ¯owing from the alleged
tort. The way in which damage is de®ned and proved in this
context is important for two reasons. It determines whether the
nuisance claim is categorised as one arising out of physical damage
or interference with the comfort/convenience of neighbouring
landowners. And whether a case is classi®ed as a physical damage
or a convenience/comfort claim determines the basis on which the
reasonableness of the defendant's interference with the plainti 's
land use is assessed.45 This raises dicult problems where the
claimant alleges damage resulting from the introduction of GMOs
by neighbouring landowners. The nature of the damage alleged to
result from cross-fertilisation of non-GM crops by crops which
have been genetically modi®ed will often be subtle. Moreover, it
can usually be con®rmed only by scienti®c investigation and
analysis. The other damage commonly in issue will be harm to the
claimant's business interests caused by a perceived threat to his
organic status, an equally dicult area which raises the question of
the limits of recovery for purely economic loss in nuisance.
The courts have signi®cantly widened the legal conception of
damage in negligence in recent years,46 and in the context of
statutory liability for e.g. emissions of radioactive material.47 In the
closely related tort of nuisance, the extant case law is more
ambivalent as to the relevance of scienti®c processes in establishing
the scope of recoverable damage. This is particularly the case where
physical damage (as opposed to interference with the use and
enjoyment of land) is the alleged cause of action. In Salvin v.
Brancepeth Coal Co.48 Sir William James commented:
45 As noted above, the ``locality'' rules are dierent for the dierent types of claim.
46 See generally C. Witting, ``Physical Damage in Negligence'' [2002] C.L.J. 189.
47 For example in Blue Circle Industries plc v. Ministry of Defence [1999] Ch. 289 (CA),
discussed further below.
48 (1874) 9 Ch. App. 705, 709. The bias against reliance on scienti®c evidence was even more
strongly put by Mellish L.J., who commented that ``unless the damage is proved to have been
sustained so that . . . every fairly instructed eye can really and clearly see it'' it is impossible to
say that substantial damage has occurred: (1874) 9 Ch. App. 705, 713.
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Although when you once establish the fact of actual damage it
is quite right and legitimate to have recourse to scienti®c
evidence as to the causes of that damage, still if you are
obliged to start with scienti®c evidence, such as the microscope
of the naturalist or the tests of the chemist, for the purpose of
establishing the damage itself, that evidence will not suce.
The damage must be such as can be shown by a plain witness
to a plain common juryman.
The cases in which the common law principles were formulated in
the nineteenth century were chie¯y concerned with the polluting
impact of heavy industrial production, and emissions of noxious
fumes and deposits from factories, coke works and the like. In
these cases the nature of the damage would be readily apparent to
the naked eye, and less sophisticated than that associated either
with GMOs or (indeed) with modern industrial processes.
Notwithstanding the enormous technological advances that have
taken place since the Victorian era, most discussions of proof of
damage in nuisance suits still start with the principles in the Salvin
case,49 an approach which ignores subsequent advances in scienti®c
methods for determining and measuring the potentially damaging
impacts of modern technology. It also de®nes very narrowly the
range of physical damage for which the law of nuisance provides a
remedy, and ignores the fact that many forms of damage arising
from modern industrial or farming processes are complex and, in
some cases, will emerge over a long span of time. The potential
environmental damage that the introduction of herbicide resistant
GM crops may cause to the natural habitat of farmland birds and
invertebrates is an exampleÐalthough the damage here will often be
attributable not to the planting of GM crops per se, but rather to
the subsequent use of herbicides or pesticides to which the crop has
been made resistant. Dicult legal problems would also ensue if
wild plant species acquired traits from closely related GM species of
cereal or fodder crop, and these gave them a competitive advantage
over other wild species which they proceeded to drive out and
replace.50 Damage to birds, animals or other wildlife would not be
49 Perhaps surprisingly, a number of Victorian decisions, including Salvin v. Brancepeth Coal Co.
are still cited as leading authorities on proof of damage in private nuisance claims in the
standard reference works e.g. Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (18th edn. 2000), at 19.09, Grubb,
The Law of Tort, at 22.14.
50 For example, hypothetical Scenario 2 in the AEBC consultation on Liability for GM releases
posits the case of forage grass which has been genetically modi®ed to make it resistant to
droughts, and sugar beet which has been modi®ed to make it resistant to salt: Agriculture and
Environment Biotechnology Commission Consultation About GM Crops: Post Commercialisation
Scenarios (AEBC September 30 2002 at p. 5). The scenario envisaged involves the drought
tolerance transferring to a wild relative of the forage grass and the salinity resistance to a
sugar beet relative, with the result that the wild plants aected gain a competitive advantage
and displace other plants in the surrounding area. Whether a neighbouring farmer whose
crops are aected could sue would depend on whether he could establish that the gene
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remediable in nuisance, as the latter is limited to protecting private
property interests. Damage to wildlife habitats may, however, be
remediable in nuisance if it can be characterised as property damage,
although the primary role in protecting habitat falls to the statutory
conservation agencies51 under environmental legislation if it occurs
in a Site of Special Scienti®c Interest52 or Special Area of
Conservation.53 The Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 makes it a
criminal oence for a third party (for example a neighbouring
farmer planting GM crops) to damage wildlife habitat within an
SSSI, but gives no civil remedy to the land owner directly aected.54
The law of nuisance may, therefore, have an important role in this
respect. Many of the leading decisions on the nature of damage
recoverable in nuisance were, however, decided over a hundred years
ago when scienti®c methods for detecting changes in the genetic and
cellular makeup of plants and animals, or the impact on the human
or animal physiology of exposure to toxic materials, was in its
infancy. If the law of nuisance is to develop a meaningful role in a
future liability regime for damage by GMO releases, therefore, the
rules for identifying and evaluating property damage will have to be
reappraised to take account of modern technological advances.
Interestingly, the courts have recently reappraised the de®nition
of property damage in the analogous context of statutory liability
for nuclear emissions.55 In Blue Circle Industries plc v. Ministry of
Defence56 ¯ooding from several ponds on a MoD site57 after a
transfer was a foreseeable consequence (this is discussed further below). If the plants aected
are wild ¯owers or weeds, however, then no one will be liable unless they are an important
species which has been designated for protection under nature conservation legislation e.g. the
area where they are found is a noti®ed SSSI under the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981. In
this case, criminal sanctions would apply under section 28 of the 1981 Act for any damage
caused.
51 I.e. English Nature, the Countryside Council for Wales or Scottish Natural Heritage:
Environmental Protection Act 1990, Part VII.
52 SSSIs are noti®ed by the conservation agencies under Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, s.
28, as amended by the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, Sched. 9.
53 Designated by the conservation agencies under the Conservation (Natural Habitats & C.)
Regulations 1994, SI 1994/2716, reg. 10. The land-use controls imposed on the owners and
occupiers of protected sites are complex, and beyond the scope of the present paper. See e.g.
C.P. Rodgers ``Planning and Nature Conservation: Law in the Service of Biodiversity?'', in C.
Miller (ed.) Planning and Environmental Protection (Oxford 2002), chap. 5. The legislation
primarily imposes obligations on the owner or occupier of land in a designated site, and not
on neighbouring landowners. It therefore has limited relevance to the issue under discussion
here, i.e. the liability of neighbouring landowners introducing GM crops for the damage that
may ensue on land in the immediate vicinity, which may include SSSIs or Special Areas of
Conservation. The primary focus of the conservation legislation is on the damage that
landowners may carry out to wildlife habitats on their own land.
54 See Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, s. 28P(6), introduced by Countryside and Rights of
Way Act 2000, Sched.9.
55 Nuclear Installations Act 1965, ss. 7, 12, impose a strict liability regime for ``damage'' to
property arising as a consequence of the escape of radioactive particles from a controlled
nuclear installation.
56 [1999] Ch. 289 (C.A.)
57 I.e. the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston.
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heavy storm resulted in radioactive plutonium intermingling with
the soil in marshland on the claimant's adjoining estate. The Court
of Appeal held that scienti®c evidence of damage was admissible in
this context, and that the change in the chemical composition of
the soil amounted to ``damage'' for the purposes of the Nuclear
Installations Act 1965. The latter imposed liability where there was
an alternation in the physical characteristics of the property caused
by radioactive substances rendering it less useful or valuable. The
plutonium had intermingled with the soil in the marsh to such an
extent that the two could not be separated, with the result that the
marshland had become ``radioactive waste'' and was unsaleable
until the contaminated soil had been removed. Unfortunately, the
court eschewed the opportunity to review the older authorities on
quantifying damage in the common law of nuisance,58 and the
decision is ®rmly located in the context of the statutory liability
regime for nuclear emissions. Particular stress was put on the fact
that the contaminated top soil on the claimants property had
become a radioactive substance within the meaning of the
Radioactive Substances Act 1960, a fact which engaged legal
liability both for its disposal and the manner in which this was to
be done.59 This clearly dierentiated the nature of the damage as
damage to property from other analogous cases where the
contamination alleged did not change the chemical composition of
the claimants property itself e.g. Merlin v. BNFL,60 where
radioactive dust discharged from BNFL's Sella®eld plant was
alleged to have been carried into the claimant's home on the shoes
of family members and pets.
The reasoning in the Blue Circle case has potential relevance in
the closely analogous context of GMO releases, where the genetic
composition of a claimant's crop may have been altered by cross-
fertilisation from nearby GM crops. Until severed from the soil,
crops are part of the land to which they are attached,61 and an
alteration in the genetic make up of one's crops would, in principle,
constitute damage to property in the same terms. In the context of
nuisance, however, there is a further question viz. whether
``damage'' is an objectively established factor, or whether it depends
58 Neither Salvin v. Brancepeth Coal Co. nor any of the other of the Victorian decisions on
establishing property damage in the law of nuisance are discussed in the judgments in Blue
Circle Industries.
59 See [1999] Ch. 289, 300 per Aldous L.J.
60 [1990] 2 Q.B. 557. The claim was discharged on the basis that damage to property meant
damage to tangible and physical property. Cf. Hunter v. Canary Wharf [1997] A.C. 655 where
it was held in the Court of Appeal that the deposit of dust on carpets from shoes could
amount to damage to personal property. This point was not taken in the appeal to the House
of Lords.
61 Law of Property Act 1925, s. 205.
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upon the subjective intent of the owner as to the intended
composition of the property damaged. If the genetic makeup of Xs
crop has been altered by cross pollination caused by wind drift of
GM seed onto his land, surely this is ``damage'', in the sense that
the physical composition of the crop is no longer that which he
intends and wishes? It has been changed without his consent. Or
should the courts have a role in determining which types of
alteration in the chemical or genetic make up of a claimant's
property will engage liability? This issue did not arise in Blue
Circle, because the soil there had been altered in such a way as to
render it a prescribed substance subject to control under the
legislation on radioactive substances. In the GM context the issue is
dierent. The precise nature of the genetic alteration to the
contaminated crop will not usually be relevant: the aected
producer will simply want his produce (whatever it is) to be GM
free.
Although presenting itself as a question relating to the nature of
the damage sustained, the issue here is closely bound up with the
de®nition and extent of property rights protected by the law of
nuisance. The decision in Monsanto v. Schmeiser62 neatly illustrates
this point. The court there held that, as soon as Schmeiser
discovered the presence of the RT73 gene in his crop (by reason of
observing its resistance to Roundup Ready) he was prevented from
selling or distributing any of the seeds produced from it, and from
planting seeds derived from that crop in successive years.63 This
arguably ignores the property rights of the farmer, who owns the
contaminated crop until severed from the land and sold, and for
whom the intrusion into it of the unwanted gene was arguably
``pollution''.64 The con¯ict between the rights of the patent holder
and those of the owner of land on which a ``volunteer'' GM plant
is found was considered on appeal, but the Federal Court of
Appeal held there to be no authority for the proposition that
ownership of a plant must necessarily supersede the rights of the
holder of a patent for a gene found in it.65 Transported into the
law of nuisance, the issues in this case are problematic. Even if the
court had accepted that the mutation in the genetic makeup of
62 (2001) 12 C.P.R. (4th) 204.
63 (2001) 12 C.P.R. (4th) 204, 242. The terms of the injunction granted at ®rst instance were
upheld on appeal: (2002) F.C.A. 309 at paras. 75±78. The injunction granted to Monsanto
prevented him from planting or growing seeds which he knows (or ought to know) contain
the patented genes, cultivating or harvesting any plant grown from such seeds, or oering for
sale, selling, marketing or distributing by any means any and all quantities of seed which
includes the patented gene.
64 See H. Wilkins and F. Latorre, ``Biodiversity at a Crossroads'', (2002) 4 Env. L. Rev. 62, 67.
65 Schmeiser v. Monsanto Canada inc. and Monsanto Company (2002) F.C.A. 309, judgment at
para. 51 (Sharlow JA).
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Schmeiser's crop was ``damage'' in the required sense to ground an
action in nuisance, he would face dicult issues of causation and
proof in establishing liability. The mere presence of the RT73 gene
in Schmeiser's crop was sucient to ground a patent claim by
Monsanto. In a nuisance action by an aected grower, however, it
is doubtful whether this would suce. Instead, the additional
question of how it got there would be a key causative issue in
establishing liability in tort, and in Monsanto v. Schmeiser this
could not be established.
GM CONTAMINATION: A ``NATURAL'' NUISANCE?
One area where the courts have widened the scope of liability in
nuisance is in relation to cases of so-called ``natural nuisance''. The
issues in many natural nuisance cases are super®cially similar to
those that arise when considering potential nuisance claims for GM
contamination. The old decision in Giles v. Walker66 was often cited
for the proposition that one could not claim for damage arising
from ``natural'' occurrences.67 This was of dubious authority as a
statement of the position in nuisance,68 however, and the broad
principle this case allegedly established was doubted in Harrow
Corp. v. Davey.69 It was ®nally exploded in Leakey v. National
Trust,70 which established that where someone has on their land, or
growing on it, a hazard which would cause damage if it encroached
on a neighbour's property, they are under a duty to do what is
reasonable to prevent or minimise that risk.
The cases expound a principle of broad application, namely that
``ownership of land carries with it a duty to do whatever is
reasonable in all the circumstances to prevent hazards on the land,
however they may arise, from causing damage to a neighbour''.71
Moreover, in expanding the potential range of liability for this type
of nuisance, the courts have shown an appreciation of the need to
update the liability rules to keep pace with changes in our
understanding of the toxicity and impact of some types of land use
66 (1890) 24 Q.B.D. 656, (1890) 62 L.T. 933 DC.
67 The Divisional Court had here held that no action in negligence lay to force a landowner to
cut thistles which were, by virtue of wind drift of their seeds, contributing to an infestation on
neighbouring land, as they were a natural growth of the soil.
68 The potential for liability in nuisance was apparently raised in argument before the Divisional
Court, but is only reported in the Law Times report of the decision (``By bringing [the land]
into cultivation he caused the thistles to grow, thereby creating a nuisance on the land just as
much as if he had intentionally grown them. The defendant by entering into occupation of the
land with the nuisance on it was under a duty to use and cultivate the land so that it would
not cause damage to his neighbour'', counsel for the plainti at (1890) 62 L.T. 933, 934.). The
judgments dismissing the claim make no mention of nuisance.
69 [1958] 1 Q.B. 60
70 [1980] Q.B. 485.
71 Peter Marcic v. Thames Water Utilities [2002] EWCA 65, at [55] (Phillips L.J.).
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activity. In the Harrow Corporation case, for example, Lord
Goddard C.J. expressly based his reassessment of the need to
impose liability for naturally occurring nuisances on the scienti®c
advances made since the Victorian era in understanding the impact
of some land-use activities on other property owners, particularly
their toxicity.72 The ``natural nuisance'' principle has subsequently
been used to ground liability for naturally occurring hazards in a
wide range of circumstances. In Goldman v. Hargrave73 a landowner
was held liable for damage caused by a ®re in a red gum tree hit
by lightning that had reignited and spread to neighbouring
property. Having failed to contain the initial ®re, the defendant was
liable for continuing the nuisance. This decision was followed in
Leakey v. National Trust, where liability was imposed for a slippage
of rocks and soil from a hill naturally occurring on the Trust's
property onto neighbouring land. Liability has subsequently been
imposed for a variety of naturally occurring hazards, including the
spread of weeds onto neighbouring land,74 encroachment of roots
and branches from self sown trees,75 ¯ooding of natural
watercourses,76 loss of support for land due to sea erosion,77 and
damage by wild birds or animals where reasonable steps to abate
the nuisance have not been taken.78 Most recently, the principle in
Leakey v. National Trust has been invoked to ground liability in
nuisance where statutory undertakers fail to take appropriate
measures to prevent foreseeable incidents of ¯ooding or sewage
over¯ow.79
The liability principles developed in the ``natural nuisance'' cases
are closely related to the law of negligence and, unlike the position
in other types of nuisance claim, establishing a duty of care is
fundamental to liability.80 The key dierence between cases of
private nuisance and ``natural'' nuisance is that where the nuisance
72 ``It may be that the court [in Giles v. Walker] was disinclined to regard thistledown as
suciently noxious to be digni®ed as a nuisance, and in 1890 agriculture was perhaps the
least regarded of British industries. We think such an action today, especially if founded on
nuisance and not negligence, as was Giles v. Walker, might have been decided dierently''
(Davey v. Harrow Corp. [1958] 1 Q.B. 60, 72).
73 [1967] 1 A.C. 6452 All E.R. 989 (P.C.), (1963) 110 C.L.R. 40 (High Court of Australia).
74 French v. Auckland City Corporation (1974) 1 N.Z.L.R. 340.
75 Davey v. Harrow Corporation (above note 14).
76 Leakey v. National Trust [1980] Q.B. 485.
77 Holbeck Hall Hotel Ltd. v. Scarborough Borough Council [2000] 2 All E.R. 705.
78 Wandsworth LBC v. Railtrack plc [2001] Env. L.R. 441 (Railtrack held liable for pigeon
droppings from a bridge at Balham station, London, onto a road running underneath.
Although a naturally occurring hazard, they were liable to take reasonable steps to abate the
nuisance, and had failed to do so).
79 Peter Marcic v. Thames Water Utilities [2002] EWCA 65; Brybrook Barn Garden Centre Ltd.
v. Kent County Council [2001] Env. L.R. 543.
80 In some of the leading cases on natural nuisance the distinction between nuisance and
negligence becomes so blurred as to become indistinguishable: see for example French v.
Auckland C.C. [1974] 1 N.Z.L.R. 340 (below n. 92). And see generally The Wagon Mound
(No. 2) Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd. v. Miller Steamship Co. Pty. Ltd. [1967] 1 A.C. 617.
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occurs naturally liability arises only if the defendant failed to take
reasonable care to prevent foreseeable damage (as in Leakey itself ).
In an ordinary nuisance suit the defendant will be liable for
foreseeable damage even if he took all reasonable care.81 The
potential for the application of the natural nuisance principle in
cases involving alleged ``contamination'' by GM crops is obvious. It
is also problematic, in that it is far from clear when the courts will
view a nuisance as ``natural''. The common thread running through
the cases is that liability for naturally occurring nuisances will only
be imposed where the hazard arises without direct human
intervention. Contamination of non-GM crops by cross-pollination
is arguably not a ``natural nuisance'' within the Leakey principle:
where it occurs this is because of a direct human intervention with
nature (the planting of GM crops on neighbouring land) and not
independently of it. On the other hand, it could be argued that
cross-pollination by wind drift or insects is a ``natural'' occurrence.
This raises the questionÐwhat must be ``natural'', the source of the
hazard itself, or that which makes it hazardous? There are dicta in
Goldman v. Hargrave82 to suggest that the principle could extend to
man-made hazards, but the subsequent cases have uniformly limited
liability to naturally occurring risks. Were the courts to extend the
natural nuisance principle to man-made hazards this would further
blur the distinction between this type of nuisance and the strict
liability rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, where breach of a duty of care
is not a prerequisite of liability.83
Adapting the natural nuisance principle for application in
relation to alleged GMO ``contamination'' would also raise a
number of other problems, particularly in establishing the necessary
duty of care. Foreseeability of damage is an essential ingredient in
establishing the duty to guard against naturally occurring nuisances.
As we have seen, under the regulatory provisions currently in force
under the Deliberate Releases Directive a scienti®c evaluation of
risk is undertaken before GM trial plantings are licensed. In R. v.
Secretary of State for the Environment ex part Watson84 the
scienti®c evaluation of the likelihood of cross pollination of the
claimant's organic sweet corn crop by the GM maize to be grown
on the adjoining test site produced a risk assessment showing a
81 See The Wagon Mound (No. 2) Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd. v. Miller Steamship Co. Pty.
Ltd. [1967] 1 A.C. 617, 640 per Lord Reid.
82 Lord Wilberforce indicated that the courts should recognise ``a general duty on occupiers in
relation to hazards occurring on their land whether natural or man made'' (emphasis added)
[1967] 1 A.C. 645, 661±662.
83 Although foreseeability of damage is now established as a requirement for strict liability under
Rylands v. Fletcher, just as it is for nuisance: Cambridge Water Co. v. Eastern Counties
Leather plc [1994] 2 A.C. 264.
84 (1999) Env. L.R. 310.
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likelihood of one kernel in a thousand being aected on a worst
case scenario if the crops were planted only 200 metres apart. The
distance between the two crops was actually two kilometres, and at
this distance there was no identi®able risk of cross-pollination
occurring. The decision to grant an authorisation was not therefore
irrational.
Although the issue arose here in the public law context (a
judicial review of the decision to authorise the GM trial), the
carrying out of a scienti®c risk assessment as part of the
authorisation process for the commercial planting of GM crops
also has relevance to the scope of liability in nuisance. Where a
scienti®c risk assessment has been carried out prior to the issue of a
Part B or C authorisation, and this certi®es that a negligible risk of
damage to crops on neighbouring farms will arise, it is dicult to
see how the foreseeability of damage necessary to establish liability
in an action for ``natural'' nuisance could be established.
Signi®cantly, the Court of Appeal noted in ex parte Watson that the
scienti®c report from the ACRE struck a reasonable balance
between the competing interests of the claimant and the proponents
of the GM trial. The court here displayed a deference to the
scienti®c evidence of risk which made it unlikely that the balance of
reasonableness as between competing land uses (GM and non-GM
cropping) would have been decided otherwise had the case been
pleaded as a nuisance action.
ECONOMIC LOSS AND THE PROPERTY RIGHTS NEXUS
There is considerable uncertainty as to the extent to which the law
of nuisance will provide a remedy for purely economic damage, for
example to farmers who lose their certi®ed organic status due to
the threat of contamination from nearby GM crops, or who have
to sell crops thought to be organic at a discount because they are
later found to be ``contaminated'' with GM matter.85 In order to
ground a nuisance action, it is not enough that the claimant's
®nancial interest is prejudiced by the action complained ofÐthere
85 The United Kingdom Register of Organic Food Standards accredits organic certi®cation
bodies, of which the largest is Soil Association Certi®cation Limited. The Soil Association
operates a zero tolerance policy for the presence of GM material in crops when accrediting
organic producers. Soil Association Certi®cation Limited has now initiated a proactive testing
programme focusing on products thought to be at risk of GM contamination, currently
oilseed rape, soya and maize. This recently produced the ®rst positive result of GM
contamination of an organic product in the UKÐorganic Soya was found to be contaminated
with Monsanto's Roundup Ready Soya at a mill producing both organic and non-organic
livestock feed. The suspect soya was imported from Italy. See Soil Association Press Release,
``GM Contamination of Organic Animal Feed'' 14 November 2002. The accreditation system
for organic produce operates within a framework laid down in EC law: see Council
Regulation (EEC) 2092/91of 24 June 1991 and Council Regulation (EC) 1804/1999 of 19 July
1999.
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must be a substantial interference with the claimant's natural rights
i.e. with an incident of his ownership and occupation of the land.
Once liability is established, however, ®nancial losses ¯owing
naturally from the nuisance will be recoverable provided they are
consequential to the nuisance proven.86 The issue is not, therefore,
whether ®nancial losses are recoverable, but rather whether
economic damage to the claimants business suces, without more,
to establish liability in nuisance in the ®rst place.87
A closely related question concerns the ability of the law of tort
to oer a remedy for an alleged depreciation in the value of land
attributable to the introduction of GM crops on nearby holdings.
Whether a depreciation in value ¯ows from the introduction of GM
technology on farms in an area will be a matter for the market,
and will depend upon market-based assumptions as to the relative
merits and economic viability of organic and non-organic
production systems. As a matter of legal principle, it is clear that
purely economic loss is not, in itself, an actionable interference with
a claimant's property rights.88 However, a reduction in the value of
the claimant's property can be evidence of substantial interference
with the claimant's use and enjoyment of his property, although it
does not of itself amount to an actionable interference.89 In St.
Helen's Smelting Co. Ltd. v. Tipping90 Lord Westbury referred to
``sensible injury to the value of property'' when de®ning liability for
material injury to a property interest. But it remains doubtful, over
a hundred and thirty years later, whether a diminution in the
selling value of land, without any physical damage, will in itself
amount to actionable damage for the purposes of the law of
nuisance.91
This rather restrictive approach sits uneasily, however, with
several of the ``natural nuisance'' cases, in which ®nancial damage
to the claimant's business has been held to be recoverable without
86 See Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd. [1997] A.C. 655, 704±706 (Lord Homann).
87 The impact of the economic loss doctrine in cases involving contamination by GM crops was
examined in the preliminary rulings in the Star Link Corn litigation in the USA: see In Re
Star Link Corn Products Liability Litigation, Marvin Kramer et al. v. Aventis Crop Science
USA Holding Inc. et al. (2002) 212 F.Supp.2d 828, esp. at 838±843. The court there ruled that
physical injury to the claimants' property was required to ground an action, and that they
could not recover for drops in market prices. However, it also ruled that they could recover
for ®nancial losses ¯owing from crops that were contaminated by Star link corn on
neighbouring farms, and losses occasioned by commingling of their product with Star link
corn in transport or in storage prior to sale. The further question under consideration hereÐ
whether losses ¯owing from loss of accredited organic status can be recoveredÐhas not been
raised in the Star link litigation.
88 Victoria Park Racing v. Taylor (1937) 58 C.L.R. 457.
89 See for example Harrison v. Good (1871) L.R. 11 Eq. 338, at 351 (Bacon V.C.); Moy v. Stoop
(1909) 25 T.L.R. 262, 263 (Channell J.).
90 (1865) 11 H.L.C. 642, 650.
91 See Thompson-Schwab v. Costaki [1956] 1 All E.R. 652; Laws v. Florinplace Ltd. [1981] 1 All
E.R. 659. And see R. Kidner, ``Nuisance and Rights of property'' [1998] Conv. 267.
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being clearly distinguished from damage to land. An example is
provided by French v. Auckland City Council.92 This case concerned
contamination by weed seeds drifting onto the plainti's land from
his neighbour's plot. Both plots were infested with variegated
thistles, and the claimant had made intensive eorts to control
them. The defendant had not done so, but it was proved that if he
had made eorts to control the weed infestation then the claimant
would have been able to get the thistles on his own land under
control within 2±3 years. As it was, his eorts were thwarted by the
continuing spread of thistles by seed from the adjoining plot. In
allowing the claim, the New Zealand High Court viewed this as an
interference with property, although there was no evidence of
physical damage to the land in the traditional sense, the actionable
``damage'' being the considerable ®nancial harm occasioned by the
claimant's need to pay for ongoing thistle eradication and his
reduced crop yields.93
This was a ``natural nuisance'' claim, but distinguishable from a
GM case in that the seed drift here was of indigenous thistles (and
therefore ``natural'' in the sense that it arose without human
intervention). Even were the English courts to extend the natural
nuisance principles to cases involving the planting of GM crops,
however, it is unlikely that this would encompass a remedy simply
for the loss in land values experienced by neighbouring organic
producers. Some support for the view that deliberate releases of
GMOs may give rise to loss which is more than purely economic
may be derived from the decision in Blue Circle Industries v.
Ministry of Defence.94 The fact that the consequence of the damage
there was largely economic was irrelevant, however, as radioactive
contamination not only rendered the land valueless but also
engaged the owner's legal liability to remove the contaminated
topsoil. The regulatory context was therefore dierent in a number
of respects.
ORGANIC PRODUCTION: A ``SENSITIVE'' LAND USE?
Where the plainti is an organic producer, a question will
inevitably arise whether this type of land use is hypersensitive. It is
92 [1974] 1 N.Z.L.R. 340.
93 The court declined to follow the old English authority of Giles v. Walker (1890) 24 Q.B.D.
656, which had held that no nuisance or negligence action lay to force a neighbouring
landowner to cut thistles ``which are the natural growth of the soil''. The court in French
allowed damages representing lost agricultural production and extra weed control costs.
94 [1999] Ch. 289 (CA), above n. 56. See also M. Cardwell, ``The release of genetically modi®ed
organisms into the environment: public concerns and regulatory responses'' [2001] 4 Env.
L. Rev. 156, 162., J. Lowry and R. Edmunds, ``Stigma Damages, Amenity and the Margins
of Economic Loss: Quantifying Perceptions and Fears'' in J. Lowry and R. Edmunds (eds.),
Environmental Protection and the Common Law (Oxford 2000), 179.
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a well-established principle of private nuisance that ``a man cannot
increase the liabilities of his neighbour by applying his own
property to special uses, whether for business or pleasure''.95 If this
principle were applied in nuisance cases arising from the release of
GMOs to the environment it would completely bar relief, and kill
any prospect of using civil liability in nuisance as a mechanism to
regulate land uses involving biotechnology.
Although the ``hypersensitive land use'' principle was not
directly at issue in R. v. Secretary of State ex parte Watson, the
Court of Appeal discussed the diculties that would be faced by an
organic producer seeking to establish liability. Buxton L.J. was
pessimistic about the likelihood of success, commenting:
If Watson's claim were to be pursued in that jurisdiction
[private nuisance], dicult questions would arise as to the
extent to which he [Watson] was seeking to impose limitations
on the National Institute for Agricultural Botany, in a farming
area, by the introduction of a specially sensitive crop [i.e. his
organic sweet corn].96
The court was clearly anticipating the successful use of the
``hypersensitive land use'' defence, ®rst established in Victorian
cases,97 when the issue of civil liability for GMO releases eventually
comes before the English courts. This would not, however, be
either appropriate or necessary. Most of the leading cases on
hypersensitive land use deal with noxious emissions, a scenario
raising quite dierent considerations, and none of the cases is direct
authority for the application of the principle in this context.
Neither have the courts always been consistent in their approach to
hypersensitivity as a bar to recovery in nuisance.98 The principal
authorityÐRobinson v. CulvertÐwas a landlord and tenant case,
primarily focused on the landlord's alleged breach of the covenant
for quiet enjoyment in the claimant's lease. The other leading
authorityÐEastern & Southern African Telegraph Co. v. Cape Town
Tramways Ltd.99Ðwas decided under the strict liability rule in
Rylands v. Fletcher, where there is more justi®cation for limiting
liability by disallowing claims based on abnormal land uses
practiced by the claimant. Signi®cantly, a more ¯exible view was
95 Eastern & Southern African Telegraph Co. v. Cape Town Tramways Ltd. (1902) A.C. 381, 393,
per Lord Robertson.
96 (1999) Env. L.R. 310, 323±324.
97 Notably Robinson v. Culvert (1889) 41 Ch. D. 88.
98 Consider for example Hollywood Silver Fox Farm Ltd. v. Emmett [1936] 2 K.B. 468, where the
principle was not applied in circumstances where the defendant had acted maliciously. The
plainti's silver fox vixens were agreed to be abnormally sensitive at breeding time, but the
defendants were nevertheless held liable in nuisance for losses ¯owing from their deliberately
®ring guns near the pens at night to frighten them, leading some vixens to eat their cubs and
others to miscarry.
99 [1902] A.C. 381.
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taken by the Privy Council in the Canadian case of McKinnon
Industries Ltd. v. Walker,100 where a foundry owner was held liable
for depositing fumes and sludge residues on the premises of a
neighbouring commercial ¯ower grower specialising in rare orchids.
Liability was admitted, but the court refused to treat damage to the
plainti 's rare orchid specimens dierently from damage to other
plants. The question whether orchid growing was a sensitive land
use was expressly left open.
Leaving aside the position of organic producers, it is dicult in
any event to see how ``ordinary'' production based neither on the
application of GM technology or organic farming principles could
be viewed as ``hypersensitive''. Yet an arable farmer practising
neither GM nor organic farming systems may object just as
vociferously101 as an organic producer to his crops being
contaminated by GM cross pollination, as this will make them
more dicult to sell. Despite the reservations expressed in ex parte
Watson, there is no logical justi®cation for regarding either organic
or ``ordinary'' arable cropping practices as hypersensitive land uses
for the purposes of the law of private nuisance, and neither does
the extant case law require this.
REGULATORY CONSENTS AND CIVIL LIABILITY
The relationship between the complex authorisation procedures
required for the release of GMOs to the environment and the
principles of civil liability are far from clear. It is an open question
whether an authorisation for the planting of GM crops would
constitute statutory authority for the commission of subsequent
nuisances, and thus give a defence to potential civil liability suits.
The nearest analogy would appear to be cases involving the grant
of planning permission for development that is subsequently alleged
to constitute a nuisance, or the grant of regulatory consents under
(for example) pollution control legislation.
In Wheeler v. Saunders102 it was held that the existence of
planning permission for the operation of an intensive pig-rearing
farm did not constitute statutory authority giving a defence to a
nuisance claim for odour emissions. The court distinguished the
statutory authority defence, which signi®es parliamentary approval
for the activity complained of, from a grant of planning permission
that merely renders lawful a land use that would otherwise be
unlawful. It is well established, however, that planning permission
100 (1951) 3 D.L.R. 577.
101 Although possibly with less cause.
102 [1996] Ch. 19.
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may be relevant in the less dramatic sense of changing the
character of the locality, a relevant factor if the nuisance claim is
for interference with the comfort and enjoyment of property rather
than for damage.103 In Wheeler v. Saunders the alleged nuisance
arose from an intensi®cation of an existing land use (pig farming)
that had been authorised by planning consent. The court
distinguished the cases on the relevance of planning consent in
changing the character of a locality, which have relevance only in
cases where no damage to person or property is alleged. Similarly,
it has been held that the grant of discharge consents under the
pollution control legislation does not constitute statutory authority,
and therefore does not give a defence to a subsequent nuisance suit
arising from euent discharges licensed under the legislation.104
In principle, nuisance claims arising from the introduction of
GM crops should fall within the principle in the Wheeler decision.
The planting of GM crops does not change the character of an
area as such, rather it represents a subtle change in the nature of
agricultural production in the locality. This may, or may not,
involve an intensi®cation of production methods, depending on the
nature of the GM crops introduced. An authorisation for the trial
planting of GM crops issued under the Deliberate Releases
Directive should not, in principle, amount to statutory authority
constituting a defence to subsequent nuisance actions.
There are also, however, subtler interactions between the
regulatory framework for GMO releases and the principles of
nuisance. The authorisation process involved in GM releases is
more complex and science-focused than the decision making process
for determining applications for planning permission for
development. In the case of GM releases, the assessment is based
on a scienti®c evaluation of the risk to the environment posed by
the GM crops under consideration.105 Decisions on planning
permission applications are determined by reference to a much
wider range of relevant factors allowed for under the Town and
Country Planning Act 1990. If a GMO authorisation has been
granted, however, there will usually have been a precise and
exhaustive scienti®c evaluation, focused speci®cally on the risk of
cross-fertilisation of nearby crops (and of wild plant species) by the
GM crop in question.
Although the issue of a GMO authorisation should not
constitute statutory authority for the commission of nuisances, the
103 Gillingham Borough Council v. Medway Dock Co. Ltd. [1993] Q.B. 343.
104 Cook v. South West Water plc [1992] Water Law 103.
105 Identifying the environmental risks involved is a matter of scienti®c enquiry. Once the risks
have been identi®ed, however, the weighting to be given to them is a matter for the regulator
to decide. See further Sampson, ``Environmental Risk Assessment of GMOs'' (note 2 above).
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nature of the risk assessment undertaken within the regulatory
framework for releases may impact upon the likelihood of
establishing liability. Were the courts to interpret cases of alleged
GMO contamination as an extension of the ``natural nuisance''
principle, establishing breach of a duty of care would become a
prerequisite for liability, requiring an assessment of whether the
defendant has taken reasonable care to prevent the damage
complained of.106 If, on the other hand, claims for GM
``contamination'' were to be categorised instead as founded in
private nuisance, foreseeability of damage would be a necessary
element in establishing liability under the principles established in
The Wagon Mound (No. 2),107 where it goes to the issue of
remoteness of damage. The importance of foreseeability of damage
as the basis of liability in both public and private nuisance has
been increasingly armed in recent cases,108 and was extended to
the closely related area of strict liability under the Rylands v.
Fletcher principle by the House of Lords in Cambridge Water Co. v.
Eastern Counties Leather.109 Indeed, Lord Go concluded in
Cambridge Water that the assimilation of the rules for remoteness
of damage would produce a more coherent body of common law
principles if the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher was to be regarded as
an extension of the law of nuisance to cases of isolated escapes
from land.110
The complex nature of the scienti®c risk assessment undertaken
prior to granting an authorisation for the commercial planting of
GM crops may make foreseeability of damage dicult to establish.
If the issue were to be judged by the scienti®c evidence available at
the time the GM authorisation is granted, then it is unlikely that
liability will be established if the advice on which the authorisation
was based indicates that a minimal or statistically insigni®cant risk
of cross pollination between GM and non-GM or wild plant
species is possible.111 The remoteness of damage principles focus
instead, however, on the need to establish foreseeability of damage
106 See Leakey v. National Trust [1980] Q.B. 485.
107 The Wagon Mound (No. 2) Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd. v. Miller Steamship Co. Pty. Ltd.
[1967] 1 A.C. 617, 640 per Lord Reid.
108 See for example Bybrook Barn Garden Centre Ltd. v. Kent County Council [2001] Env. L.R.
543.
109 [1994] 2 A.C. 264 (H.L.).
110 [1994] 2 A.C. 264, 306. The escape of chemical solvents into the plainti 's borehole was not
in fact an isolated one in this case, but a continuing one, a fact which indicated that this
would classically have been regarded as a case of nuisance (pp. 306±307). By analogy it is
unlikely that the release of GMOs onto neighbouring property, thereby ``contaminating''
non-GM crops by wind drift or cross pollination by insects, would be regarded as an isolated
escape within the Rylands v. Fletcher principle, rather than as a straightforward example of a
potential private nuisance.
111 As in R. v. Secretary of State for the Environment ex part Watson (above note 27) for
example.
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by reference to the scienti®c knowledge and data available when the
act or omission that gave rise to the alleged nuisance took place.112
It follows that if a producer were to plant a GM crop some time
after a Part C market authorisation had been granted, and the
scienti®c evidence changed in the interim to indicate that a higher
environmental risk than was thought to be the case is present, then
in principle it may be possible to establish foreseeability of damage.
It is relevant to note that under the 2001 Deliberate Releases
Directive GM authorisations will in future have to renewed every
ten years. This will leave less scope for the scienti®c evidence on
which authorisations are based to become obsolete, but this
remains a very real possibility given the rate of technological
advance in this area.
The proposals in the Draft EC Framework Directive on
Environmental Liability are considered in detail below. It is perhaps
worth noting in the context of the above discussion, however, that
the Draft Directive, although proposing a wider range of liability
than is currently oered by the civil law systems of most EU
member states, contains a ``scienti®c safeguard'' clause113 under
which no liability would attach to emissions or activities which
were not considered harmful according to the state of scienti®c
knowledge at the time when the emission was released or activity
took place. Neither would liability accrue where a permit or
authorisation has been issued to the operator, a defence that would
clearly encompass a GM authorisation issued under the Deliberate
Releases Directive. Neither defence would apply, however, if the
operator has been negligent,114 and the scope of the potential
liability to which this might give rise will undoubtedly be one of
the issues on which extensive discussion will take place before the
®nal shape of the Directive is agreed.
TOWARDS A PUBLIC LIABILITY REGIME FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE?
It can be seen from the foregoing that there is potential for English
Law to make provision for civil liability for some kinds of damage
to property interests arising from the introduction of GMOs, but
that wider damage to ecosystems and biodiversity is unlikely to be
remediable within the framework of the law of nuisance. The
112 See Lord Reid's dictum in The Wagon Mound (No. 2) Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd. v.
Miller Steamship Co. Pty. Ltd. [1967] 1 A.C. 617, esp. at 640, and (in the closely analogous
area of Rylands v. Fletcher liability) the analysis of Lord Go in Cambridge Water Co. v.
Eastern Counties Leather [1994] 2 A.C. 264, 306.
113 See article 9.1 Proposal for a Directive on Environmental Liability with regard to the
prevention and remedying of environmental damage, COM (2002) 17 ®nal (especially article 9.1.
(c) and (d)).
114 Article 9.2, ibid.
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failure of most EU member states' legal systems to make adequate
provision for civil liability for ``environmental'' damage of this kind
was a principal driving factor in the development by the European
Commission of proposals for the introduction of general legislation
governing environmental liability, to be enacted throughout the
Community. This culminated with the publication in January 2002
of the Commission's proposal for a Directive on Environmental
Liability.115 This initiative originated in a hastily prepared green
paper issued in 1993, which focussed chie¯y on traditional damage
remediated under member states' civil liability regimes, but
suggested a strict liability regime for damage resulting from
pollution.
By the time the subsequent White Paper on Environmental
Liability was issued by the Commission in 2000,116 its thinking had
moved away from establishing a strict liability regime located
within the civil law of member states, and had moved instead
towards imposing on member states the responsibility (through
their administrative direction and cost recovery mechanisms) for
ensuring that those who threaten or cause environmental damage
should bear the cost of preventing and repairing that damage. The
White Paper expressly noted the desire of several member states to
ensure that legislation should address the issue of environmental
damage caused by the release of GMOs.117 This commitment has
been taken forward in the Draft Directive on Environmental
Liability, but its provisions are rather more limited than many
would wish.118 The Draft Directive is part of a package of measures
intended for GMOs. It should be set in the context of the recent
revisions to the Deliberate Releases Directive,119 agreement on
which was only reached with the European Parliament in the EU
conciliation committee on condition that environmental liability for
GMOs was addressed within a set timescale.
The liability regime applied under the Draft Directive applies to
two dierent categories of damageÐ``environmental damage'' to
which a strict liability regime is applied, and ``biodiversity damage''
to which a fault-based regime can be applied. Under the Draft
Directive member states will be required to ensure that operators
whose activities fall within the categories listed in Annex 1 to the
Directive must bear the cost of taking action to prevent or to clean
115 COM (2003) 17 ®nal (23 January 2002). See generally [2002] 14 Environmental Law and
Management 5 (B. Jones).
116 COM (2000) 66 ®nal.
117 COM (2000) 66, Executive Summary.
118 For criticism see Maria Lee, ``Tort, Regulation and Environmental Liability'', (2002) 22 Legal
Studies 33.
119 Eected in Council Directive 2001/18/EC. See above note 2.
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up such ``environmental damage'' as they threaten or cause,
irrespective of fault. Member states are required to establish strict
liability regimes as regards administrative direction to prevent
harm, and regarding remedial action to reimburse costs incurred by
public bodies in remedial action. As regards biodiversity damage,
liability extends to all operators (not just those carrying out Annex
1 activities) to bear the costs of protecting and repairing legally
protected wildlife sites. The Commission regards biodiversity
damage as a species of damage in respect of which member states
civil liability regimes have not developed in a substantial way. This
is certainly the case in English law, where the emphasis on the need
to prove property damage in the law of nuisance places
considerable diculties in the way of establishing civil liability for
this type of harm.
The Draft Directive encompasses environmental damage
resulting from both the contained use of GMOs within the scope of
Directive 90/219/EEC and deliberate releases of GMOs to the
environment within Directive 2001/18/EC. These are both
occupational activities listed in Annex 1, which will engage liability
under article 3 of the Directive. The Draft Directive is much more
limited in its application to damage caused by the release of GMOs
to the environment than had initially been anticipated, however. In
the ®rst place, the legislation will not be retrospective.120 Neither
will it apply to ``traditional'' damage, in the form of damage to the
person or goods. Perhaps most importantly, although a wide
de®nition is given to ``environmental damage'', as regards
biodiversity liability would only extend to damage to the
conservation status of natural habitats and species either protected
under the 1979 Wild Birds Directive121 or the 1992 Habitats and
Species Directive,122 or for which areas for protection or
conservation have been designated under national legislation.123 In
the UK context, this means that liability would only extend to
damage to biodiversity in special areas of conservation designated
under the Habitats Directive, or to Sites of Special Scienti®c
Interest noti®ed for protection under Part 2 of the Wildlife and
Countryside Act 1981.124 The Explanatory Memorandum to the
Draft Directive explains this geographically restrictive approach in
the following terms:125
120 Article 19, COM (2002) 17 ®nal.
121 Council Directive 79/409/EEC, [1979] OJ L 103/1.
122 Council Directive 92/43/EC, [1992] OJ L 206/7.
123 Article 2.1 (2) and (18) ibid. (de®nitions of ``biodiversity'' and of ``environmental damage'').
124 See Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, s. 28, amended by Countryside and Rights of Way
Act 2000, Sched. 9.
125 COM (2002) 17, at p. 17.
C.L.J. Release of GMOs 399
It is to be noted in relation to the de®nition of biodiversity for
the purpose of the proposal that the de®nition of ``biological
diversity'' in article 2 of the Convention on Biological Diversity
could not be considered at this stage as providing a suitable
basis for the proposed regime, including as far as liability be
attached to genetically modi®ed organisms is concerned. The
Convention's de®nition goes beyond habitats and species and
subsumes the idea of ``variability'' so that it could be argued
that damage to biological diversity would encompass
``variability among living organisms''. Such an approach raises
delicate questions as to how such damage would be quanti®ed
and what would be the threshold of damage entailing liability.
The Draft Directive also includes a number of exceptions to
liability, several of which will have importance in respect of liability
for GMOs. No liability would accrue for damage caused by ``an
emission or event allowed in applicable laws and regulations, or in
the permit or authorisation issued to the regulator''.126 The complex
authorisation procedure for GMO releases under Directive 2001/18/
EC may, therefore, preclude liability from arising in cases where it
has been authorised under national implementing legislation.
Further, no liability would accrue for damage arising from
emissions or activities which were not considered harmful according
to the state of scienti®c knowledge at the time when the emission
was released or the activity took place.127 Finally, biodiversity
damage is de®ned so as to exclude adverse eects which result from
an act by the operator which was expressly authorised by the
relevant authorities in accordance with provisions implementing the
regime for the management of special areas of conservation under
the Habitats Directive,128 or any provision of national law having
an equivalent eect in relation to habitats or species. In the context
of the regulatory regime for protected sites in the UK, for example,
operational consent granted for an activity in an SSSI under the
Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981129 would preclude liability.
While the Draft Directive will undoubtedly extend liability
throughout the Community, therefore, it is unlikely that this will
have a signi®cant eect on damage resulting from GMOs. The
Directive would undoubtedly impose more stringent safeguards in
wildlife sites designated for protection under the Habitats and Wild
Birds Directives, thereby imposing liability for biodiversity damage
resulting from the release of GMOs to the environment. The
territorial limits placed upon the scope of the proposed liability,
126 Art 9.1(c), ibid.
127 Art 9.1(d), ibid.
128 See Directive 92/43/EEC, articles 6.2 and 6.3.
129 See Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, s. 28E, as amended by Countryside and Rights of
Way Act 2000, Sched. 9.
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however, mean that in practice its impact would be minimal. The
Natura 2000 network of protected wildlife sites designated under
the Habitats Directive will, when complete, extend to about 10% of
the territorial extent of the Community. These sites are, in practice,
geographically situated mostly in areas unsuitable for the large-scale
cultivation of GM crops. The majority of claims arising from the
introduction of GM crops are likely to be for economic damage to
organic producers' businesses, and environmental damage within
non-protected areas or to non-protected species of ¯ora and fauna.
These types of claim would not be assisted by the measures in the
Draft Directive.
CONCLUSION
The Draft Directive on Environmental Liability represents a retreat
by the European Commission from its earlier intention to address
the dierential (and largely undeveloped) state of civil liability for
environmental damage in the member states. In relation to GMOs
this is to be regretted, as there is a need for a uniform and
coherent approach to civil liability for damage arising from the
introduction of GM crops. This will, however, require the
development of a clearer distinction between public law remedies
(for wider environmental damage) and civil liability in nuisance.
Given the restricted scope of the environmental liability regime
posited in the Draft Directive, the law of nuisance may have an
important role to play in supplying a civil liability regime in
English Law to resolve property rights disputes involving GM
crops. If this potential is to be realised, however, a fundamental
reappraisal of a number of its basic tenets will be required. The
courts could classify cases involving GM crop contamination as
either ``natural nuisance'' cases, or as instances of physical damage
to property. An approach based on the principles of natural
nuisance would have some advantages for potential claimants, not
least the more generous attitude to recovery of economic losses
evident in some of the recent decisions. The jurisprudence on
``natural nuisance'' is, however, closely related to the law of
negligence, and establishing the necessary duty of care in GM cases
could be dicult where a scienti®c risk analysis has been carried
out under the regulatory regime for GMO releases. If, on the other
hand, the courts were to classify alleged ``contamination'' by GM
crops as falling within the scope of nuisance occasioned by physical
damage to property, this would introduce a number of dierent
problems. In particular, the rules for identifying those classes of
damage for which nuisance can provide a remedy would require
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reappraisal to take account of modern methods of scienti®c
discovery and proof. Whichever approach is adopted, the rules
dealing with recovery of economic loss by ``organic'' producers
must be clari®ed, as must the legal status of GM authorisations
and their interaction with the rules for remoteness of damage in
nuisance.
Establishing a viable civil liability regime for adjudicating on
property rights disputes arising from GMO releases will involve an
expanded role for the common law. It is worth noting in conclusion
that the House of Lords were unpersuaded in Cambridge Water Co.
v. Eastern Counties Leather of the need to expand common law
jurisdiction in the environmental context at a time when extensive
legislative frameworks are being put in place to regulate the
principal environmental concerns.130 The EC Draft Directive on
Environmental Liability signals a withdrawal from legislative
intervention in the area of liability for GMO releases and,
notwithstanding the sentiments expressed in Cambridge Water, this
is therefore one area of environmental regulation where the
common law can legitimately develop an expanded and meaningful
role.
130 See for example the speech of Lord Go [1994] 2 A.C. 264, 306.
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